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Abstract 
In the rational expectations paradigm, one solves models of a large number of agents who 
optimize subject to a stochastic law of motion by assuming that all agents know that law 
of motion. If the agents do not know that law of motion perfectly, one needs a learning 
model. This paper follows the optimal learning literature by assuming that each agent 
constructs priors about the unknowns of the problem, and then updates those priors 
using the Bayes updating rule. The agents need to construct priors on the distribution 
of other agents' priors, and then on the distribution of priors on the distribution of 
priors, and so on, leading to an infinite hierarchy of beliefs. The existence of an optimal 
response given the current state vector and hierarchy of beliefs is proved. It is then shown 
that the resulting equilibrium, labeled the Rational Expectations-oo equilibrium can be 
approximated by an E-equilibrium where the infinite hierarchy is truncated at some level 
n( E), and each agent believes that all of his higher level beliefs are concentrated at their
true values. 
Keywords: Rational expectations, Bayesian learning, bounded rationality. 
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1 Introduction 
Consider a monopolistically competitive market for some product. Let the firms produc­
ing this commodity be indexed by I= [O, l]. At each time period t, each firm chooses
its level of production qi, then the aggregate supply in the industry is determined by 
Q, = J1 q)di. The price of the commodity will be implicitly determined by q) and the
demand for i's product D)(p) is randomly drawn from F(Q1; 0) which depends on the 
aggregate supply in the industry and an unknown parameter 0 E 0. Each firm wishes to 
maximize its expected discounted sum of profits E0 L�o 8'[pixi - cost( xDJ given the law
of motion for its demand. This framework is reminiscent of many of the early rational 
expectations models (e.g. Lucas (1973)), where each firm is a price taker, but non-trivial 
collections of firms can influence the price. This class of models allows one to study 
equilibrium models without having to incorporate signaling considerations in the firms' 
strategies. In the body of the paper, we shall consider a more general version of this class 
of models. 
In the rational expectations paradigm, one would study this class of models by as­
suming that the true {)* E 0 is known to all agents, and that that is common knowledge.
Once we introduce uncertainty about 0, the problem becomes much richer. Even though 
agents are still infinitesimal, the price schedule facing any individual firm depends on 
the level of production of all other firms. The behavior of the other firms depends on 
their beliefs about the parameter {), hence each firm will try to formulate its belief on
the distribution of beliefs about 0. But now, the behavior of the other firms depends on 
their beliefs about the distribution of beliefs about 0, hence e�ch firm will formulate a
belief on the distribution of beliefs on the distribution of beliefs on 0, and so on. But 
clearly, a la Harsanyi (1967-68), Boge and Eisele (1979) and Mertens and Zamir (1985), 
this leads to an infinite hierarchy of beliefs, which in our dynamic model will also have 
to be updated as each period's prices are observed. 
*This paper wa� motivated in part by lengthy discussions \vith Peter Bossaerts about equilibrium 
asset pricing without rational expectations. I am grateful to Kim Border for enlightening technical
discussions. All errors are, of course, my o'vn. 
The motivation of this paper diverges from that of Mertens and Zamir (1985) and 
the related literature in two aspects. The first, which has already been mentioned, 
is the dynamic nature of our model. The second and more important aspect is the 
approximation result that we seek in this paper. Mertens and Zamir (1985) provide an 
approximation result which is purely driven by their proof of the compactness of the space 
of beliefs, from which the approximation by finite belief subspaces follows immediately. 
The characterization of that approximating finite belief space is not discussed in Mertens 
and Zamir (1985). 
In this paper, we seek to prove a very specific approximation result, namely one 
where agents only use finite hierarchies of beliefs, and as 'the level ofthe hierarchy gets 
higher, the approximation of their value function (and hence their optimal decision rule) 
approaches their values using the infinite hierarchy. We obtain this result at the expense 
of constructing the model so that we can assume away all strategic behavior by the agents 
(which would turn our model into a very complicated signalling game). 
This paper also diverges in its purpose from much of the recent "optimal learning" 
literature (e.g. Easley and Kiefer (1988), Nyarko (1991)) in that we are not interested in 
the issue of convergence of beliefs to rational expectations as more time periods pass (and 
more state draws are observed). It can easily be verified that such results can still be 
generated along similar lines (by means of the Martingale convergence theorem as adapted 
to the infinite belief hierarchy framework by Nyarko (1991), and to the sequential model 
by El-Gama! and Sundaram (1992) ). Our desired approximation result is perhaps closest 
in spirit to that of Blume and Easley (1992), where the emphasis is not on learning as time 
passes, but on approximations of perfectly rational behavior with sub-rational behavior. 
The subrationality ofB!ume and Easley (1992) is in the use of updating procedures other 
than Bayes, whereas our subrationality here is the failure of agents to construct priors 
on variables that affect their payoffs, maintaining the assumption that they use Bayes's 
rule to update those priors that they have constructed. 
In this paper, we study the general form of the market described above, taking into 
consideration that the uncountable set of agents optimally (i.e. using Bayes 's rule) update 
their beliefs about the parameter B, as well as the distributions of beliefs of the other
agents at all levels of the infinite belief hierarchy. We prove that with this learning rule 
introduced, there exists an equilibrium for that economy in the form of a mapping for 
all agents from their beliefs and the current state (price vector) to actions (levels of 
production). We shall label this equilibrium the Rational Expectations-oo equilibrium. 
The idea behind this .. notation .. {<lnd.11ence. the .. .titleco£J;he.4iaper.) is .. that a rational 
expectations equilibrium is obtained under the assumption that all agents know the 
true B*, and that is common knowledge. We can label this equilibrium the Rational
Expectations-0 equilibrium. We can think of agents having different beliefs on 0, but 
the distribution of beliefs about B is known to all agents, and it is common knowledge.
This yields the Rational Expectations-I equilibrium. Similarly, truncating the infinite 
hierarchy of beliefs on distributions of beliefs on distributions of beliefs on ... , etc. at 
any level n and introducing a common knowledge distribution of the n'h level beliefs on
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distributions of beliefs on ... , etc., we obtain the Rational Expectations-n equilibrium. 
The standard epistemological problem with all rational expectations arguments is 
the question of where the agents get those correct beliefs. Further problems arise when 
we also consider the implications of the consistency of beliefs conditions of Harsanyi 
(1967-68) and Mertens and Zamir (1985). We shall completely avoid assuming common 
knowledge at any level of the belief hierarchy, and hence avoid those epistemological 
problems. We simply assume that each agent is a Bayesian expected utility maximizer 
with some priors over all aspects of his environment that can influence his payoffs. We 
then prove that given an E > 0, there exists an n E N such that it pays each agent to 
ignore his beliefs on the distribution of nth level beliefs as-long as all other agents ignore
those higher level beliefs. This will be an E-equilibrium where all agents act as though 
they knew the true distribution of the nth level beliefs, since they never update their 
n + pt level belief. We then define the Rational Expectations-n( E) E-equilibrium as the
resulting E-equilibrium where all agents use only their belief hierarchy up to level n, as 
if their n + 1st level beliefs were given and concentrated at their true value (although, of
course, that implicit n + pt level belief need not be correct).
In section 2, we rigorously introduce the general form of the model. In section 3, we 
prove the existence of the Rational Expectations-oo equilibrium. In section 4, we prove 
that if all agents were to truncate their beliefs at the nth level, then the loss in utility to
any agent from not constructing n + 1st level beliefs can be made less than E by picking
n sufficiently large. This will lead to an €-equilibrium with all agents holding a hierarchy 
of beliefs up to the nth level. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Rigorous Statement of the Model 
We start this section by defining the problem of the representative agent in the economy. 
Throughout the paper, the following notation is maintained: 
N.1 I = [O, l] is the agent space. A typical agent will be referred to as agent i. The 
measure of a Borel subset A E I is defined by Lebesgue measure. 
N .2 For any Hausdorff space L, J( L) is the Baire a-algebra, and '.JJ( L) is the space of all 
regular Borel probability measures on J( L). Elements of '.JJ( L) that place an atom 
of mass 1 at I E L will be denoted by fi1. We shall denote the support of an element
µ E \!Jtl), -Le; ·the subset of Lon which µ-places jYosltive mass,'by supp(µ) .
N.3 (Y, J(Y), v) is a measure space where Y is a compact Baire subset of a complete,
separable metric space. The support of v is taken to be all of Y .  Y will be referred 
to as the state space. 
N.4 (0, J(0)) is a measurable space. E> is assumed to be a compact Baire subset of a 
complete separable metric space. E> will be referred to as the parameter space. 
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N.5 ( X,J( X)) is a measurable space. X is a compact Baire subset of a complete sepa­
rable metric space. ( X, J( X)) will be referred to as the action space. 
N .6 There is a continuous, bounded, strictly concave, measurable function r: X x Y x 
Y ---> IR. referred to as the ( instantaneous) reward function.
N.7 /3E( 0,1) denotes a discount factor. 
In what follows, the original space 0 will be endowed with the metric topology, each space 
q:J( L) will be endowed with the weak-* topology, and each space LI will be endowed with
the Tychnoff ( product) topology. 
All agents i E I are assumed to have the same action space X in which they choose
actions to maximize the expected discounted sum of rewards defined by the function r. 
In other words, agent i solves the problem 
00 
max E0 ,L f3'r(xL yj, yj+l){x�} t=O 
subject to the market and technological constraints summarized by the state transition: 
where i, E xr has projection xj. At each time t, each agent i observes the entire state
vector Yt E yr for all firms. He then chooses action xi, and observes the next period's fft+r.
realizing the instantaneous reward r( xLYLYi+1). We now state the main assumptions of
the paper: 
( A.1) q(. Ix, y, x; 0) is jointly continuous in all its arguments.
(A.2) Given any Borel subset A C I of agents with Lebesgue measure zero, q( .Ix', y, x; 0) =
q(.lx, y, x; 0) if x'i =xi, Vj 'f A. 
(A.3) Agents use Bayesian updating, but do not take into consideration that other 
agents also use Bayesian updating. 
(A.4) q(.lx,y,x;O) has full support for all x E xr,x E X,y E Y,O E 0.
Assumption.( A .. 1.)..will b;i.need@d in-establishing..the-<*ist@aoo-ef:ca-a-equilibrium later on. 
Assumption (A.2) insures that the agents do not act strategically ( since no single agent 
can by himself affect the transitions or beliefs of any other agents). Assumption (A.4) 
is more general than we need, but it is sufficient to ensure that all fl,+1's are observable 
so that Bayesian updating is always possible. Assumption (A.3) is perhaps the most 
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substantively disturbing. It amounts to assuming that agents are in effect chasing a 
moving target which they assume to be stationary.1 
The true value of the parameter e E 0 is unknown to the agents. We let agent i's
initial belief on 0 be .>.�1 E <;JJ(0). The collection of initial beliefs of all the agents in
the economy is represented by .>.�·1 E <:µ( 0 )1 = A •·1. Each agent formulates a belief on
that collection of initial beliefs, and we write that as .>.�2 E <;JJ(A•·1). We recursively
define .>.�n
+l E <;JJ(A•,n). We call .>.�n agent i's n'h level belief at time 0, we call .>.�,n the
configuration of nth level beliefs in the economy at time 0. The belief of the individual
is defined by ).i = (.>.i·1, ).i·2,. .. ) E Ai. The entire configuration of beliefs is defined by
.>. • = ( .>. 0•1, .>. 0•2,. .. ) E A•. It can readily be seen from our construction that ).i is a belief
on 0 x A•. 
3 The Rational Expectations-oo Equilibrium 
We presuppose that there exists a common knowledge continuous optimal decision rule 
/:Ai x Y --+ X that each agent i assumes that other agents use to choose their actions
xf = f(.>.{,y{). This decision rule induces the function F: A• x Y1 -t X1 which agrees
with f on each coordinate j E I. Now the transition rule for the state of agent i can be 
written as vi+i � q(. IF(y,, .>.n, yj, .?:j; 0). 
On (Y1, ®1�(Y)), we define the measure iJ by the unique extension of the finite
products of v (by theorem in Neveu (1965, p.82)). All other measures and transitions 
on Y 1 will be constructed with respect to that measure. This allows us to define the
transition on Yt from agent i's perspective: 
<Ii(Y't+1IF(y,, .>.;), Y,, x;; 0) = IT q(Yl+1IF(y,, .>.;), yf, f(y{, .>.i); 0) x q(vt+1IF(!h, .>.;), yj, x;; 0) 
j;l:i 
Now, after the agent chooses xj and observes Yt+i. he updates his belief on 0 x A•
using Bayes's rule. For B a Baire subset of 0 x A•: 
J <Ii(Yt+ilF(y,, .>.; ), 17,, x;; O) ®k'=i .>.;·k ( a.>.;·k-i)
.>.;+1(B) = Q5(.>.;,y,, y,+i,x:J = -"'s--------------.�k--7k-1� f <Ii(Y'i+1IF(y,,.>.r),y,,xi;B) ®/;"=1 .>.:· (d.>.;· - )0xA• 
Where, for-notational.convenience1 •• we . .define A�·0.;;;;.6l.-'Ghe-fellewi-ng·lemma states that
the Bayes updating map for a given agent is continuous. 
1 Unfortunately, for technical reasons, this assumption has to be inade, otherwise the various rational 
expectations equilibria discussed below may not exist. If we were to allow agents to get into an infinite 
sequence of updating given that others have updated given that ... etc., the Bayes updating map at best 
is not continuous, and at worst does not exist, depending on the framework, rendering our methodology 
for proving the existence of equilibrium useless. 
5 
Lemma 1 'l3: Ai x Y1 x Y1 x X -+ Ai is a continuous map.
Proof: A•,D =El is endowed with its metric topology, and '.:µ(A.,0) is endowed with the
weak-* topology. Y and X are endowed with their metric topologies, and X1 and Y1 
are endowed with their Tychnoff topologies. Each measure >.i E @%'=0'.:µ(A •,k) is uniquely 
defined by a well known theorem of Ionescu Tulcea (cf. Neveu (1965, p.162)). It is 
topologized with the product of the weak-* topologies on each of its components, where 
A•,k = <.:µ(A•,k-l)l is endowed with the product topology. 
Given that El is compact (in its metric topology), and given our construction of'.:µ(.) 
as the space of regular Borel measures on its argument, it follows that '.:µ(El) is compact in 
the weak-* topology (cf. Choquet (1969, Corrolary 12.7, p.217)). By Tychnoff's theorem 
(cf. Rudin (1973, A.3, p.368)), it follows that <.:µ(8)1 is compact in the product topology. 
According to the same result, <.:µ('.:µ(E>)f) is compact in the weak-* topology, and so on. 
Hence, each component of the infinite product space A• = A •,l x A •,2 x .. ., which defines 
the entire configuration of the infinite hierarchies of beliefs of agents in the economy, is 
compact. Another appeal to Tychnoff's theorem yields the compactness of the product 
space A• in the product topology. 
Now, let (Y:,, Yv, x�, >.�) -+ (j/', y, xi, >.i) in the product topology (product of the topolo­
gies constructed in the previous paragraph). The sequence {>.�} of measures has been 
shown to be defined on a compact topological space (El x A°), and hence is tight. It 
follows by Bergstrom (1982, Theorem 2, p. 87) that {>.�} is uniformly o- smooth; 1.e. 
given a sequence of sets Av',  0, >.UAv) -+ 0. Letting 
Av= {(Y':,, yv, x�): lqi(Y:,IF(yv, >.'), Y:,, x�; 8)- qi(j/'IF(y, >.•), y, xi;8) 1 > E},
it is clear by the continuity of F and q that Av -+ 0 independently of the values of 8 and 
>.•. Taking a subsequence Av' ',, 0, it follows that Av•(Av') -+ 0. Hence, for B a Baire 
subset of El X A., 
1. ; -(""IF(- ' ") - i 8) oo 1ik(d ' •k-1) ;-(...,IF(-,.) - i 8) ""'oo 1ik(d ' •k-1) v\� qi Yv Yv , A ,yv,X11j ®k=l /\� A' = qi Y y,A ,y,x, VYk= IA' ./\' . 
B B 
This equality holds if the outer integral is taken over any non-trivial Baire set B C A •,n 
and hence, the result follows. I 
Now, the state of the economy from a given agent i's perspective is fully described at t 
by the state y, E Y 1, and the agent's belief >.i E Ai. This augmented state space S = Y1 x 
N is now our subject of study. Given the current augmented state (Y,; >.:J of agent i, and
after observing the new state Yt+l which is randomly drawn from q;(. IF(y,, >.;), Y,, xj; 8),
the agent will update his beliefs on (8, >.;) using Bayes's rule as above. We can thus define 
the transition (from the agent's point of view) on the agent's augmented state space as 
follows: 
Q( Al>.i, y, xi) = J J IA (f/; 'B(>. i, y, i/, xi) )qi(f!IF(y, >. •), y, xi; 8)iJ( dy ') @/;';,1 >.;,k ( d>.;,k-1 ).
A• yI 
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Where A is a Baire subset of yI x A', and as usual IA(.) is the indicator function for the
set A. Given the continuity of q, and the proven continuity of Q:I, the following result 
follows straight-forwardly: 
Lemma 2 Q is weakly continuous. 
Proof: Given a sequence (sv,xv) = (yv,Av,xv)---> (s,x) = (i/,.X,x) in the product topol­
ogy, and given a continuous bounded function h: S ---> JR, we need to show that 
j h(s')Q(ds'lsv, xv)-> j h(s')Q(ds'ls,x).
s s 
Expanding the L.H.S., we get 
f j h(iJ', Q:l(iJ', A�, f!v, Xv) )Cj;(iJ'IF(iJv, A•), f!v, Xv; B)v( dy') 0�1 A�k ( d.\ o,k-l ).
= y 
IT A'·• 
k::O 
By the continuity of h, F, Q:I, and q, and the hypothesized weak convergence of A� to ,Xi,
we know that given an f > 0, the sequence of sets 
Ev= {sv: Ii h(s')Q(ds'lsv, xv)- j h(s')Q(ds'js, x) I > E}-> 0.
s s 
Taking a subsequence Ev' which converges monotonically to 0, and again appealing to 
Bergstrom (1982, Theorem 2, p. 87), we have Av•(Ev') ---> 0, and the result is proven. I 
We can now prove the main theorem of this section establishing the existence of 
a continuous optimal action mapping g: S ---> X which will be identified with /. In 
anticipation of the result, we define the value function for the problem ( whose existence 
is yet to be proved) by: 
00 
V(s) = V(iJ, .Xi) = maxE0 L f3'r( xLy;,y;+1),
{xU t�o 
subject to the state transition (j;(.j., ., .; .), and all other agents using the continuous rule 
f(., .) . To further simplify the notation, let us define the expected instantaneons reward
i'(xi, s) = j i•(x',11',·!l'') ii(!l'ilF\y;;\•),yi;x�;i!) ®�i-:\''k-Ca.X•,k-1).
E>xA' 
The value function V( s) exists if and only if it satisfies the Bellman equation 
V(s) = max{i'(xi,s) + f3 ( V(s')Q(ds'ls, xi)}.x•EX JS 
We now state and prove the existence result. 
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Theorem 1 The value function V( s) is well defined, and there exists a continuous policy 
Junction g: S ---+ X such that 
g(s) = argmax{i'( x',s) + (J { V(s')Q(ds'ls,xi)}.x1EX ls 
Proof: We have shown conditions (W) of Schiil ( 1975, p.360):
1. The action space X for each agent is compact ( by assumption),
2. The state transition Q: Ai x Y---+ 'fl( A• x Y) is weakly continuous ( by Lemma 2.2),
3. r: X x Y x Y ---+ JR is continuous and bounded from above ( by assumption),
to be satisfied. 
Under these conditions, together with the assumption that S is a Borel subset of a 
complete separable metric space, Schiil ( 1975, Theorem 5.6, p.362) shows that the space 
of policies is compact, and the mappings from beliefs to expected payoffs are upper semi­
continuous. On inspection of Schiil's proofs, it is clear that metrizability is not used 
anywhere except to establish that all measuresµ E 'fl( S) are regular with respect to the 
system of compact sets. For that purpose, metrizability is clearly not necessary and the 
exact proofs go through for our ( non-metrizable) case as long as S is a-compact ( which 
it is) and we consider 'fl( .) to be the space of regular Borel measures defined on the Baire 
a-algebra instead of the Borel a-algebra ( Royden ( 1968, p. 307)). 
Appealing to the theorem of the maximum ( cf. Berge ( 1963, p.116)), and using the 
above proven existence of the value function ( and its continuity), it follows that there 
exists an upper-hemi-continuous correspondence defining the set of maximizers of V( s ). 
By the assumed strict concavity of r( ., ., .), that correspondence is single-valued, and
hence continuous. This concludes the proof. !!! 
4 The Rational Expectations-n(E) E-Equilibrium 
We start this section by defining the Rational Ex;pectationsui.eqnilibrium. The intuitive 
idea is as follows. The traditional rational expectations equilibrium is obtained under 
the assumption that all agents know the true {)* E E> which defines the stochastic law of
motion for the state variables. If() is not known, one can think of a case where each agent 
constructs a belief .\i,I on E>, and that the actual distribution of beliefs, .\*'•1 E 'fl( E>)1,
is common knowledge, i.e. 'ii E I, .\i·2 = b>,*'.i. In that case, we can solve for the 
equilibrium ( which we call the Rational Expectations-I equilibrium) where agents use 
x, = F(iJ,, .\*"•1) in constructing the transition kernel on their augmented state spaces.
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Similarly, we can assume that agents do not know the true distribution of first level 
beliefs, and hence have different second level beliefs A "2, but that the distribution of 
.X'·2's is known to be .X*"•2, and so on. This argument motivates the following definition. 
Definition 1 The Rational Expectations-n equilibrium is the equilibrium obtained by 
endowing all agents with beliefs A£.n+I = 8>.*•,n, where A*°•n has projection _xi,n.
Now, if we were to truncate the beliefs of all agents but one at the nth level, it pays the
remaining individual to keep n + V'.level beliefs on the distribution .. of.ntf level beliefs.
To establish our result, we need to show that given e > 0, and if n is chosen sufficiently 
large, the value of holding the n + 1st level belief to that remaining agent (as opposed to
truncating his beliefs at the n'h level) is less than e. To that end, we need first to define
an e-equilibrium. 
Definition 2 If all agents use a strategy g(s), and the optimum response of any given 
agent to the population playing g(s) is f (s) , and if almost surely [.Xi@ VJ 
r(J(s),s) + /3 fs V(s')Q(ds'ls,f(s))- e < r(g(s),s) + /3 fs V(s')Q(ds'Js,g(s)),
we say that g(s) is ant-equilibrium. 
We are now ready to state our definition of the Rational Expectations-n( E) £-equilibrium,
and prove the approximation result. 
Definition 3 A Rational Expectations-n( t) £-equilibrium is an £-equilibrium where each
of the agents acts AS IF he is in a Rational Expectations-n equilibrium, i.e. AS IF his 
n + 1st belief is a correct, common knowledge, degenerate belief. Those fictitious n + 1st 
level beliefs need NOT be correct, and need NOT be the same for all agents. 
Theorem 2 Given an E > 0, there exists an n( t) E N such that there exists a Rational 
Expectations-n( e) £-equilibrium.
Proof: We.nrsLdefine .. the..analog .. o.Li:( x!,�)-w.here. all. .the4her...agents .use only beliefs
up to the n'h level of the hierarchy (i.e. f(s) depends only on the first n _xi.k's) , and hence
agent i uses an n + 1st hierarchy of beliefs, as follows:
n 
IT J\•,kk=O 
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Using this expected instantaneous reward function, the agent's value function is defined 
by 
Vn+1(s) = max{rn+1(xi,s) + (3 { Vn+i(s')Q(ds'js,xi)}.x1EX Js 
To assess the loss to the agent from truncating his own hierarchy of beliefs at the nth
level when all other agents do, we define 
rn(xi,s) = J r(x',y',y'i) q(y'ij F( y, .\•, 1, ..  ,.\•·n),yi,xi;li) 0k=1,\i,k(d.\•·k-1), 
n-1 
IT A··· 
k=O 
and the corresponding value function 
Vn(s) = max{rn(xi, s) + (3 { Vn(s')Q(ds'js, xi)}.x1EX Js 
Now, by Jessen (1934, pp. 270-277), we know that a countably infinite multiple inte­
gral on a compact space is the almost sure limit of the integrals over the first n elements.
In other words, whether or not F(y, ,\•,I, ,,,, ,\ .,n, ,\ •, n+I , ... ) depends on ( ,\ •,n+i, ,\ •,n+2, ,, , ),
the functions fn(xi, s) ( which are potentially dependent on all .\•,k fork> n) -"=+i-(x', s). 
This directly establishes that as n I oo, rn and rn+I converge a.s. to the same limit. 
This in turn establishes the convergence of Vn(s) to Vn+i(s) a.s., and establishes that as 
n [ oo, the loss to agent i from truncating his beliefs at the nth level, given that all other
agents do, converges a.s.[.\i 0 ii] to zero.
Given an E, the chosen n depends on s, and we define it by n( E;s) = min{n E 
N: IVn+1(s)- Vn(s)I <€}. It is clear by the continuity of fn(x',s) and rn+1(xi,s) that if 
If n+i ( x', s) - fn(x', s )I < / then there exists an open neighborhood around ( x', s) such
that for all (x',s') in that neighborhood, lrn+i(x',s')- fn(x',s')I < /· By the continuity 
of the optimal policy function g(s), and its finite hierarchy analogs (gn+i(s) maximizing 
Vn+I ( s ), and gn( s) maximizing Vn(s )), that neighborhood of (x', s) can be made to contain 
all the maximizers of Vn(s') and Vn+i(s') for alls' in the neighborhood. It follows that 
given E > 0, there exists a small neighborhood of s such that if IVn+1(s) - Vn(s)I < E, 
then for alls' in that neighborhood, JVn+i(s')- Vn(s')I < t. Hence, the function n(t;s) 
is uppersemicontinuous on the compact space S, and therefore attains its maximum. We 
then define n( E) = maxs n( E; s) for our Rational Expectations-n( t) €-equilibrium. I
5 Concluding Remarks: 
In general, rational expectations equilibria. in dynamic models where agents a.re endowed 
with infinite hierarchies of beliefs may not exist. In this paper, we have presented a 
simple model in the tradition of rational expectations models, where the agents can be 
endowed with correct common knowledge beliefs at any level of the hierarchy. These 
endowments of common knowledge beliefs at various levels of the belief hierarchy are 
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seen as generalizations of the traditional concept of rational expectations. This paper 
provides a belief structure such that we can truncate the hierarchy at some finite level 
while maintaining some notion of bounded rationality. This is done without imposing 
any common prior or common knowledge assumptions. The model presented here is suf­
ficiently simple that one can generate an E-equilibrium where each of the agents behaves 
AS IF he is endowed with the correct beliefs at some level n of his infinite belief hierar­
chy. In other words, each of the agents acts AS IF he is in a Rational Expectations-n 
equilibrium. This allows us to analyze the behavior of agents in econometric models with 
only a finite number of levels of beliefs (hopefully small) , with possible heterogeneity of
beliefs that can persist forever. This in turn can provide us with much more interesting 
dynamics than convergence to full knowledge rational expectations equilibria. 
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